Introduction: Cultural Memory, the Past and the Static of the Present by Law, Jane Marie
Introduction: Cultural Memory,  
the Past and the Static of the Present 
 
 
“The past is not dead. In fact, it is not even past.” 
W I L L I A M  F A U L K N E R  
 
The burgeoning field of study loosely known as “cultural memory studies” fills a 
strange gap between more traditional historiography and the anthropology of memory. 
Historiography in the more traditional sense embraces the stance that the past is 
knowable, verifiable to the extent that we have reliable evidence, and retrievable to 
some extent. It concerns itself with what happened in the past (and the many 
complications of knowing that). Cultural memory studies, on the other hand, address 
what Paul Ricoeur so aptly labeled “the mnemonic phenomenon,” the dialogical 
process through which collectivities recall the past in light of present concerns that are 
in part shaped by this very past that is being recalled and refashioned in the present. For 
the scholar of cultural memory, the object of study is not the past, but the many projects 
memory undertakes: healing, denial, revision, invention, recreation and re-creation, 
forgetting. What is the relationship between history and memory? What should it be? 
Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945) may have anticipated this field ahead of his time 
with his late in life work On Collective Memory, published posthumously in 1950.1 
Halbwachs’ work was significant, not only because of its relatively early date in this 
now vibrant discussion on cultural memory, but because he seems to be one of the first 
theorists to liberate the study of memory from the realm of the private and the 
individual. It was assumed in the mid twentieth century that while collectivities may 
undergo history, memory was a largely personal affair. Halbwachs, by taking dreams as 
private and inherently unshareable recollections of the past as his starting point, 
demonstrated how memory is not private, like dreams, but collective. Further, memory 
is not only essentially a reconstruction of the past in light of the present, but also a 
process largely determined by social forces beyond the control of a single individual. 
This paradigm shift, from the agency of the individual to the forces of social 
reproduction, is now a cornerstone of contemporary critical theory, but we note here the 
work of this early theorist in pointing out the broad path cultural memory studies would 
come to take more than fifty years after his death.   
____________ 
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 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Cosner, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
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In this brief introduction to this special volume of Acta Orientalia Vilnensia, we 
survey a few of the prominent features and concerns of contemporary cultural memory 
studies. While not an exhaustive list by any means, this survey of concerns will help 
orient the reader to the kinds of issues being addressed by cultural memory studies 
today. These issues are: 1) the ever present tendency in cultural memory studies to 
argue for a “presentist” view of the past and the inherent problems with an 
over-reliance on this dialogical nature of remembrance at the risk of overshadowing 
historiography’s role in creating a record; 2) the role of memory in amnesia and 
masking; 3) the creation of counter-memory as a mode of coping with painful or 
unthinkable pasts; 4) cultural memory as a form of historical revisionism and 
denialism; 5) the relationship between the project of remembrance and the 
transformation and even invention of tradition; 6) the institutionalism of selective 
memory through museum design; and 7) the dilemma of the new cultural memory 
studies paradigm and the need for what can be called “effective cultural memory,” as a 
mode of honestly confronting the past in the task of truth and reconciliation. 
The presentist tendency  
in cultural memory studies 
If the past is whatever we remember it to be, does it matter what ever really 
happened? This is the underlying concern with the tendency in cultural memory studies 
to focus on the role of the present in shaping memory. Lewis Cosner, the translator of 
Halbwachs’ seminal work, noted in Halbwachs’ directions set out in his work the firm 
insistence that memory is a socially constructed phenomenon. While Cosner does not 
try to disabuse us of this observation, he notes a disquiet with a view of memory that on 
the surface could appear to give the past no claim to a voice of its own. When 
Halbwachs argued that “no memory is possible outside frameworks used by people 
living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections,”2 he presents a strong 
case for what we know as a “presentist” view: that it is the present social context that 
makes the past not only meaningful but even retrievable at all. It is not difficult to see 
why standard historiography, always a work in progress but aiming for reliable 
evidence to lay witness to the past, would find such an insistence on the mechanisms of 
the present as having sole agency to be problematic. It is debatable whether Halbwachs 
was indeed the presentist that Cosner read him to be. But the fact remains that the 
tendency to insist that all memory is social and all social memory is informed by the 
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The role of memory in amnesia and masking 
Paul Ricoeur in his work Memory, History, Forgetting3 explores how certain acts of 
remembrance also include an element of amnesia and masking. Why, for example, he 
queries, is the Holocaust so often invoked and remembered, and yet the Armenian 
genocide, the McCarthy era in the United States and the role of the French government 
in North Africa hardly recalled in collective memory of the past century at all? Ricoeur 
suggests that remembering can also be a way of forgetting, that the over-remembrance 
of one event allows for the careful forgetting of other events. Remembrance can be a 
way of focusing attention away from what happened in one arena onto what just as 
surely happened somewhere else. Ricoeur explores the phenomenon of forgetting as an 
almost necessary component of cultural memory. To remember as a society is to know 
what you need to forget. Yet Ricoeur calls for the very legitimate demands of justice 
being served in any nuanced understanding of how we remember and forget. 
Here again, this kind of study of the past could not exist as a form of historiography 
in its own right, and the concerns of a presentist view of history shadowing a more 
traditional form of historiography are drawn into sharp relief. 
 
The creation of countermemory as a mode of coping with painful  
or unthinkable pasts 
It was Michel Foucault who drew attention to the phenomenon he termed 
countermemory. In his essay entitled “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault 
argued for a separation of history and memory, and maintained that in fact 
countermemory is a strategy for displacing what he considered to be hegemonic 
processes of remembrance. Memories from the margins, from the oppressed can be 
regarded as countermemories to mainstream memory, but at the same time they also 
exist within the sphere of those hegemonic memories.4 Later scholars, expanding the 
category Foucault delineated, have come to use the term countermemory more broadly: 
A countermemory is not the content of a memory itself, but rather the-role a particular 
memory is playing in a larger construct of remembrance. A countermemory can be 
fictive in nature, or it can be a form of excessive remembrance of one event at the 
expense of other events. It can be a memory whose job is to subvert the dominant 
memory, or it can dislodge the tenacity of the mainstream or obvious memory. And 
countermemory can be a way of Re-remembering the past, through a lens forcing one to 
review one’s own past with a present agenda. In my essay in this volume, we see how 
____________ 
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 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
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 In Michel Foucault, Language, Countermemory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. 
Donald Bouchard, trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1977). 
J A N E  M A R I E  L A W  10 
the Sugihara narrative in Japan, as presented by the Sugihara museum in Gifu 
prefecture, can be seen as a kind of countermemory. What Sugihara did in Lithuania is 
well documented, but the manner in which the museum in Japan situates Sugihara 
almost in a historical vacuum, dehistoricized alongside other altruists from history, 
allows for this memory to be a countermemory to what ELSE Japan was involved in 
during the second world war. Present day Japanese schoolchildren and museum goers 
can re-remember the past of World War II as a powerful (and self-identifying) narrative 
of altruism and humaneness. 
Foucault’s term has also been expanded to apply to another kind of memory, 
namely fictively romanticizing the past so as to promote an agenda in the present. 
Nostalgia, never a reliable lens on the past, can be regarded as a kind of countermemory. 
Here, a presentist interpretation is in order, for what can rightly be known in the 
exploration of the forces producing countermemory is the present concerns than 
demand it, and not necessarily the past it claims to keep alive.5  
 
Cultural memory as a form of historical revisionism  
and denialism 
Studying the production of historical revisionists and history deniers is rightly the 
work of scholars of cultural memory. Why do certain kinds of historical revisionism 
never succeed and others end up being successful beyond their promoters’ wildest 
dreams? In Masaki Matsubara’s paper in this volume, he explores one of the main 
centres of World War II historical revisionism in Japan, Yasukuni Shrine, and shows 
how the commemoration of the day of defeat, August 15, for Japan in World War II is 
in fact a public spectacle of revisionism. Revisionism is not merely a way of denying 
the past, but a way of being in the present. Exploring the nuances of historical 
revisionism and denial and the many projects it serves is rightly the work of scholars of 
cultural memory. But as Ricoeur and others suggest, the work of the cultural scholar 
cannot be neutral in the face of revisionism, for it is rarely benign.  
 
The relationship between the project of remembrance  
and the transformation and even invention of tradition 
How do you remember the past when reliable sources for its recollection are scarce? 
Why is it necessary to make something which is actually new appear to be steeped in 
tradition? How does these “new” traditions assume a life of antiquity all their own? 
How do revival projects claim to be acts of restoration, when in fact they often, almost 
____________ 
5
 See Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, New York: Basic Books, the Perseus Books Group, 
2001. 
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as a rule, are actively and creatively inventing a past?6 This kind of inquiry also falls 
within the realm of cultural memory studies. Can one remember a past that never 
happened or is fabricated? Lisa Kuly’s article in this volume explores how the revival 
of the Hanamatsuri festival in Japan actually involves the selective use of an almost 
solitary historian, and has come to include a number of concerns that are decidedly 
contemporary. The revival of the Hanamatsuri festival is one of many cases of Japanese 
folk performing arts being resurrected and refashioned in Japan. The process of 
creating “authentic” relics of the past and the critiquing of authenticity discourses in 
their own right is also a part of the work of cultural memory studies. 
 
Institutionalization of hegemonic memory production  
through effective museum design 
Can your most important memory be something that happened before you were 
born? Something you never directly experienced? One of the most dynamic areas of 
cultural memory studies is the exploration of the changing role of museums in our 
society. Where we once expected museums to “tell us what happened,” we now go to 
museums to have an experience that allows us to “remember” the past, even if it 
happened before we were born or did not involve us. Museums can now make us all 
“victims” or “survivors,” participants in the past who experience history first hand, in 
the virtual world of the museum. Brian Brereton in his article in this volume addresses 
the role of “hell theme parks” popular in contemporary Taiwan among people at 
different life stages, and suggests that these museums function as a kind of catharsis for 
childhood memories cast onto heavenly deities and demons. Further, in my piece, I 
suggest that the Japanese Sugihara museum invites participation, mimicry and even the 
possibility to rescue oneself from death as both victim and savior. What both of these 
forms of museum have in common is their focus on crafting an experience for the 
museumgoer, beyond imparting knowledge about the past or other realms. 
Museum studies have become a field of cultural critique in its own right. These 
studies operate as an important part of cultural memory studies insofar as museums 
have become the locus of crafted collective memory.7 In fact, it is apparent that 
museum creation and allowing museumgoers to have a certain kind of experience have 





 See the now classic book edited by Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, The Invention of 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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 See the large volume exploring themes in museum design and cultural memory, edited by 
Bettina Messias Carbonell, Museum Studies: An Anthology of Contexts (Malden, MA and Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2004). 
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Truth and reconciliation: is there a past to remember? 
The final dilemma for the scholar of cultural memory is to find a place for the past to 
speak for itself, not forever fragmented through the prisms of the present’s claims to it 
or memory’s claims to it. In fact, one could argue that in the end, this is precisely the 
discursive space that the cultural memory scholar clears. On the surface it seems naïve 
that the work of critical scholars should come round to asking the simple question: 
What actually happened? How can we know it? Can it be remembered and 
commemorated collectively with any accuracy? But this is precisely where the work of 
cultural memory studies gets its ethical thrust. Remembering the past can be a creative 
process, and situating oneself in a shared temporal web is a necessary part of being in a 
society. But insofar as the work of reconciliation and redress demands an honest 
confrontation with the past, what I will term “effective cultural memory,” and when the 
work of collectively recalling the past becomes a means of abandoning the rightful 
claims of justice, the mnemonic phenomenon, to return to Ricoeur’s phrase, must be 
brought into line with the legitimate claims of the past to speak with its own voice, 
however hard it may be to hear through the static of the present. 
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